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19. Cross- national diffusion in Europe
Ioannis Lianos, Mihály Fazekas and 
Maksim Karliuk
19.1 INTRODUCTION
The diffusion of the use of various forms of impact assessments (IAs) in 
different political settings and legal traditions illustrates its great mal-
leability and the operation of various factors. The adoption and effec-
tive implementation of IAs in Europe is nevertheless characterized by a 
great degree of variability among jurisdictions, despite the considerable 
influence exercised by the Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU), across the 
European continent (for example, De Francesco 2012; Radaelli 2005; 
Turnpenny et al. 2008).
This diversity is not only reflected in the adoption of different models of 
IA across the various jurisdictions examined, but also in the way this 
practice is effectively implemented. IA usage varies of course within each 
jurisdiction through time and often depends on the specific policy area in 
which it is intervening (for example, environment, health, social policy, 
competition) (Dunlop et al. 2012). There might also be some dissonance 
between the intended use of IA, as this is  proclaimed in the foundational 
texts, guidelines, legislation, constitutional (or other) provisions that 
have been put it in place in each jurisdiction, and its day- to- day use in the 
policy- making process. Previous research has established that there are 
different IA ‘types’ in Europe.1
Factors explaining the various types of IA implemented in various 
European jurisdictions include the patterns of diffusion from one 
country to another, the interaction of politics with expert knowl-
edge  and the  prevailing ‘evidence eco- system’ in each jurisdiction 
(Lianos and Fazekas 2014).2 We illustrate this phenomenon by explor-
ing diffusion  patterns not only in terms of the adoption of IA, but 
also in terms of the adoption of IA types. We do so by introducing a 
taxonomy developed with the purpose of describing the interaction of 
politics and expertise in each jurisdiction (Lianos and Fazekas 2014). 
We then connect the  diffusion process with the type of IA prevalent in 
a jurisdiction.
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Empirically, we draw on a unique database of over 2000 IAs pro-
duced  across Europe in 2006 Q1–2012 Q2 developed by the Gutenberg 
project at the École Nationale d’Administration, France and at the Centre 
for Law, Economics and Society at University College London.
19.2 IA DIFFUSION
19.2.1 Adoption and Implementation
Diffusion consists of (1) adoption and (2) implementation (Adelle and 
Weiland 2012; see also Chapter 18). Adoption refers to the formal intro-
duction of the IA into the legal system. Implementation may be concep-
tualized as referring to the stages after the decisional point of adoption or 
more generally to the ‘depth of adoption’ (De Francesco 2010), in essence 
through direct practical experience with IA indicated, among others, 
by the frequency of its use, the scope of impacts covered, the quality of 
assessment, its role in the policy- making process and eventually its insti-
tutionalization, the latter concept referring to its ‘permanence within an 
organization, enduring through elections and changes in government’ 
(De  Francesco 2010, p. 169). The process of implementation of the IA 
system into a specific organizational and institutional context is pro-
longed and has several phases (De Francesco et al. 2012). It should not 
be excluded that the transplantation of IA in political and legal systems 
that do not present functional equivalents to the system where the trans-
plant originated may produce completely different outcomes, leading to 
 situations of ‘diffusion without convergence’ (Radaelli 2005).
19.2.2 Patterns of Diffusion: A Typology
Diffusion may be vertical, horizontal or both. Vertical diffusion operates 
through higher levels of governance, for example, through the  influence of 
international organizations or the federal level, when exploring intra- state 
processes of diffusion. The most important of the former are probably 
the OECD and the EU. Horizontal diffusion involves  interconnectedness 
of governments when elites communicate and interact, exchanging ideas, 
solutions and experiences (De Francesco 2012).
There are also different patterns of diffusion:
● Learning resulting from internal (for example, the  characteristics 
of public administration, legal and constitutional frame-
works,  administrative culture) or external sources (for example, 
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 transnational  institutional linkages, government decisional interde-
pendence,  epistemic communities)  (De Francesco 2010).
● Externalities providing incentives altering the cost- benefit 
ratios of domestic actors, such as competition among govern-
ments  for   ‘regulatory quality’ (leading them to adopt and imple-
ment policy innovations), coercion (when the diffusion of the 
specific  policy innovation results from the use of material or 
economic power, including asymmetric bargaining imposing con-
ditionality for  these reforms, or binding legal norms adopted by 
 supranational institutions), and contractualization (when diffusion 
results from some form of symmetric bargaining between states, or 
‘soft’  international organization influence) (Morin and Gold 2013).
● Socialization among networks of experts and/or administra-
tive elites (De Francesco 2010) leading to ‘the  internalization 
of  shared  beliefs due to the interaction of actors’ (Heinze 
2011, p. 12).
● Emulation indicating the ‘desire (or need) of domestic actors to 
conform to internationally widespread norms’ in order to ‘increase 
the legitimacy of policy choices’ (Heinze 2011, p. 12).
Some recent studies have focused on the micro- foundations of trans-
border policy diffusion, advancing the importance of the electorate in 
pushing for the adoption of ‘successful’ policy innovations developed 
elsewhere (the ‘voter information model’) (Linos 2013). These  patterns of 
diffusion alter the material incentives domestic actors face, for example, 
through the mechanisms of conditionality and competition, and through 
the mechanisms of learning and emulation, in some cases various diffusion 
mechanisms working in parallel.
19.2.3 Patterns of Diffusion in the European Continent
Research on diffusion of policy innovations in the EU (and also OECD) 
Member States has shown that the decision to adopt IA depends on a 
number of factors, including the presence of transnational networks, gov-
ernment expenditure and legal origin (De Francesco 2012). The overall 
results show the important contribution of transnational networks in 
the diffusion of administrative innovations. The ‘mediative’ role of the 
OECD (De Francesco 2012, pp. 1296–7), perceived as a forum to facilitate 
discussion among experts for the best policy solutions, was found to have 
played a prevalent role in the adoption of IA procedures in various OECD 
Member States, thus illustrating the  vertical dimension of diffusion, in 
particular through processes of socialization and emulation.
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The EU has also operated as an agent of diffusion, the process 
being channelled by the high- level Mandelkern Group Report on Better 
Regulation (2001), which recommended the introduction of IA as an 
 integral part of the policy- making process not only at the EU but also 
at the Member States level.3 Member States were advised to ‘carry out 
impact  assessments where they use the right of initiative for new legis-
lation’ to ‘submit an impact analysis of draft national rules that they 
notify to the Commission’ and ‘to define standards for consultation and 
impact assessment for the transposition of those Directives that leave 
them broader margins for implementation’, one of the principal aims of 
the Commission being to improve the quality of national transposing 
 measures (European Commission 2002).
The Commission recognized that to be fully efficient, EU IA practices 
need to be complemented, ‘where necessary, by equivalent practices in 
the Member States’ (European Commission 2004a). Developing its better 
regulation agenda, the Commission recommended Member States to 
establish national ‘better regulation’ strategies, in particular, IA systems, 
and encouraged them to aim for a scope of coverage similar to that 
of the Commission’s integrated impact assessment system (European 
Commission 2005a).
As a result of this process of diffusion, the declared objectives and moti-
vations for introduction of IAs are usually similar across EU Member 
States. They primarily focus on improving the quality of regulations (EU, 
Denmark, France, Poland, UK – for more on the UK, see Chapter  16), 
reducing administrative burden on business (Netherlands, Denmark), 
making policies more transparent (Italy) and combinations thereof (see 
more in European Parliament 2011, pp. 44, 45). However, looking to the 
micro- foundations of diffusion, the incentives domestic actors face in 
introducing IA may differ in each circumstance. For instance, Croatia had 
to introduce IA of proposed new policies and legislation in order to receive 
the  Programmatic Adjustment Loan by the World Bank (World Bank 
2005). A recommendation of the OECD about improvements in regulation 
played an important role in the adoption of the IA tool in the Czech Republic 
(Vítek 2010). In Estonia, the better regulation agenda and the adoption of 
an IA system resulted from OECD and EU initiatives (Kasemets 2012) 
that led the Ministry of Justice to create a special IA working group with 
the task to draft IA guidelines making use of the European Social Fund 
(Justiitsministeerium 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b).
Of particular interest is the vertical process of diffusion by the OECD 
and the EU in non- EU Member States. The tools for the vertical diffu-
sion of IA at the OECD include technical assistance, reports and training. 
The EU disposes additional tools and, arguably, more leverage,  primarily 
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through its practice of conditionality with regard to third countries 
 (non- EU Member States). EU conditionality is exercised via the tools of 
annual progress reports, recommendations, conclusions, opinions, enlarge-
ment strategies, association agendas, action plans and so on. Furthermore, 
the process of integration of third countries into the EU trade system 
provides the latter a unique leverage over their domestic developments, 
leading to what some have called ‘the Brussels effect’ (Bradford 2012), thus 
 providing an illustration of the coercive pattern of diffusion.
The principle of conditionality has played a central role in the promo-
tion of policy and administrative reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
(De Ridder and Kochenov 2011) in the last two decades and now in the 
Western Balkans and beyond. The EU conditionality consists basically in 
the development of institutional links and the provision of financial and 
technical aid, as well as, crucially, access to the EU internal market and/or 
accession to the EU, conditional upon compliance with its various legal, 
policy and institutional requirements (be these democratic principles, 
acquis and so on) (Maresceau 2001, p. 18). Two types of conditionality 
may be distinguished: (1) pre- accession conditionality and (2) market 
access conditionality. The first is applicable to countries that are in the 
process of accession to the EU (and which have a candidate or potential 
candidate status); the second, for countries that are not (yet) likely to 
accede to the EU. Such conditionality, if rightly applied, may have a spill-
over effect by leading to the adoption and implementation of IA systems 
covering all domestic legislation and regulation. One may, however, ques-
tion the permanence of the implementation of IA in these instances of ver-
tical diffusion, in particular as following eventual accession to the EU, the 
conditionality incentive loses its clout. This is a topic for further research.
These practices illustrate that the EU’s intervention has expanded 
on issues that do not fall within the narrow scope of the ‘acquis’ and 
may even be considered to lay outside its core competences when deal-
ings  with the current Member States (De Ridder and Kochenov 2011). 
The task of  preparing the accession of new Member States to the EU was 
interpreted  very broadly, leading to a wider reach of the conditionality 
principle: not a single aspect of the functioning of the candidate countries 
was to be regarded as immune from the EU’s scrutiny (Kochenov 2005). 
As long as IA became part of the EU reform agenda, it was added  to 
the EU’s outreach to third countries. This has not been the case (at least 
to the same degree) prior to the accession of the Central  and Eastern 
European  countries to the EU. This is understandable as there was no 
well- developed IA system in the EU at the time.
Candidate countries4 and potential candidate jurisdictions5 approxi-
mate their legislation to that of the EU (Lazowski 2002). The European 
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Commission constantly monitors the reform and approximation progress 
of these jurisdictions using the tools of annual progress reports, recom-
mendations, conclusions, opinions, enlargement strategies, association 
agendas, action plans and so on. Part of this monitoring covers the adop-
tion and implementation of IA systems, ensuring their quality and apply-
ing them to particular policy fields and areas of legislation. The assessment 
of existing IA systems forms part of all reports of all monitored countries 
(however, progress reports for Iceland and Bosnia and Herzegovina refer 
to environmental impact assessments only). Thus, the 2012 progress 
report on Turkey notes the lack of progress in developing an IA system 
with a view of increasing the quality of legislation. The Commission was 
particularly concerned about the absence of an IA conducted prior to the 
adoption of some key legislation, for example,  the reform of the educa-
tion system, and stated its concern about its significant costs and impact 
on quality (European Commission 2012a, pp. 12, 42). A clear condition 
for introducing environmental impact assessments in order to receive 
financial assistance was imposed back in 2004 (European Commission 
2004b,  p. 24). In Croatia, the adoption,  implementation and enforce-
ment of IAs were closely monitored during the last pre- accession years 
(European Commission 2012b, p. 31).
The countries that aspire to become EU Member States, but do not 
dispose of a candidate or potential candidate status, or even officially pro-
nounced by the EU with the prospect of becoming an EU member, such 
as Moldova and Ukraine, also approximate their legislation with the EU, 
and are forerunners of this process in Eastern Europe. IA formed an inher-
ent part of the first EU- Ukraine Action Plan in 2005 requiring Ukraine 
to ‘[a]dopt and implement a system of impact assessment of regulatory 
measures, consultation of stakeholders, and prior notification of regula-
tory changes to economic operators to ensure transparency (predictability 
of regulatory environment)’ (European Commission 2005b). The action 
plan also involved the adoption of a system for environmental impact 
assessments. Later, however, a general system of IA was excluded from the 
focus of action plans (later called association agendas), only environmen-
tal impact assessment being left as a requirement.
19.3 THE DATA
Turning to data, the main empirical findings discussed in this section 
derive  from an IA- level database recording key characteristics of each 
individual text (for a full discussion of data collection, see Lianos and 
Fazekas 2014). The underlying data collection exercise estimates the total 
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number of IAs produced between 2006 Q1 and 2012 Q2 in 21 European 
countries6 at 26 308 IAs, or 179 IAs per year per country. This high 
average  figure is due to a few highly active countries such as Estonia 
(4681) and the UK (2410). In some countries, no relevant IA activities 
could be identified during the examined period (such as Belgium, federal 
level); while in others, data collection and coding could not be carried out 
(Austria, Portugal and Latvia).
We applied a stratified random sampling with each year- country com-
bination as a stratum that served our goal of analysing both variation 
across countries and within countries over time. In practice, a random 
sample was drawn from the identified full list of IAs per country per year. 
We coded at least 15 IAs per country per year7 (if there were fewer IAs 
produced by a given country in the given year our sample was smaller, of 
course) (Table 19.1).
The coding of each IA followed a predefined coding template of 125 
variables organized around the following variable groups (full template in 
Lianos and Fazekas 2014):
● background variables
● costs
● benefits
● comparison of costs and benefits
● evaluation of alternatives
● methodology – general
● methodology – discount rate and inflation
● presentation, structure
● consultation
● special topics – compliance/implementation
● special topics – health impacts
● special topics – administrative burdens
● special topics – competition assessment
● special topics – environmental impact assessment
● special topics – social impact assessment
● further specific topics
● referencing.
The coding was done manually by trained coders. All coded IAs were 
quality checked by a dedicated quality assurance team (for details, see 
Lianos and Fazakas 2014). Further empirical material was collected 
on the institutions pertaining to IA production and use. These institu-
tional characteristics were identified by investigating official government 
 documents and organizational structure.
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19.4  DIFFUSION ON THE GROUND: A CLOSER 
LOOK AT WHAT DIFFUSION REALLY MEANS 
IN PRACTICE
19.4.1 Diffusion of IA Institutions
IA institutions have spread across Europe, this trend translating into a 
quantitatively large IA activity (Figure 19.1). Interestingly, the average 
number of IAs produced in a year per country increased from 151 in 2006 
to 277 in 2012, which suggests that adopting IA institutions did result in 
Table 19.1  Distribution of IAs according to year of publication and 
country, 2006Q1–2012Q2 (non- weighted)
Country/year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012a Total
Bulgariab 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 15
Czech Republicb 0 3 22 18 23 17 20 103
Denmark 10 12 24 15 22 20 21 124
Estoniab 0 0 9 6 7 4 9 35
EU Commission 76 88 114 77 51 119 32 557
Franceb 0 0 0 3 14 9 2 28
Germany 16 15 18 15 16 15 18 113
Greeceb 0 0 0 0 10 14 46 70
Hungaryb 0 0 0 0 2 32 68 102
Ireland 5 4 7 5 9 7 12 49
Italy 13 44 16 23 20 9 1 126
Netherlands 1 2 5 1 2 5 3 19
Norway 11 9 12 7 10 10 10 69
Poland 18 20 20 20 24 21 26 149
Romaniab 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 22
Serbiab 0 6 12 11 9 10 11 59
Slovakia 8 13 11 13 11 13 2 71
Slovenia 7 10 7 8 8 8 8 56
Spainb 0 0 14 12 10 10 10 56
Sweden 10 10 11 10 9 10 10 70
UK 17 41 17 20 20 11 27 153
Total 192 299 319 278 277 344 337 2046
Notes:
a.	 IAs only from 2012Q1–Q2.
b.	 Laggard country (adopting in 2007 or later).
Source: Gutenberg project database.
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using them. However, what is unclear from a macro- perspective is what 
kinds of IAs have European countries produced.
A first and probably most elementary aspect of the diffusion of IA 
institutions is the adoption of key institutional characteristics that could 
underpin IA production. Three such institutional characteristics deserve 
particular attention as they capture the aid to and control of IA quality 
and the  prescribed IA quantity:
1. Publication of an IA handbook: whether an official methodological 
aid is published and valid in the given year in a country.
2. IA board- type body: whether a (semi- )independent central body is 
functional that is devoted to checking IA quality in the given year in a 
country.
3. Mandatory IA for parliamentary bills: whether IA is mandatory for 
every bill introduced to the parliament by the government in the given 
year in a country.
The diffusion of these key institutions supports a mixed view: on the one 
hand, more and more European countries adopt key IA  institutions that 
are essential for running an effective IA system. On the other hand, there 
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Source: Gutenberg project database.
Figure 19.1  Total number of countries adopting IA and total number of 
IAs produced across Europe, 2006Q1–2012Q2
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is a persistently wide gap between overall IA adoptions and the underlying 
quality of the IA institutional framework (Figure 19.2).
19.4.2 Diffusion of Different IA Types
Following Lianos and Fazekas (2014) five different IA types have been 
identified along seven dimensions:
● Scope of analysis: the number of impact areas that are touched upon.
● Sophistication of analysis: the complexity and extensiveness of 
applied analytical methods.
● Consultation: extensiveness of consultation as reported in the IA 
text.
● Accountability: the degree the IA establishes accountability rela-
tionships between the lawmaker/regulator and the regulated.
● Evaluating at least one alternative policy option.
● Including a quantitative estimation of regulatory costs.
● Including a quantitative estimation of regulatory benefits.
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IA board-type bodies
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IA adoptions
%
Notes: * Data only refer to the first half of 2012.
N total = 21.
Source: Gutenberg project database.
Figure 19.2  Proportion of European countries adopting various basic IA 
institutions, 2006Q1–2012Q2
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The identification of distinct IA types along these dimensions was carried 
out using advanced clustering techniques tightly integrated with theoretical 
considerations (Table 19.2). These categories are  predominantly  descriptive 
while their significance lies in that they  indicate different boundary arrange-
ments between politics and expertise prevalent in each jurisdiction (Hoppe 
2005, 2009).
This multi- dimensional typology shows that well- developed IA systems 
may cater for diverse demands, most notably channelling societal 
demands through consultation into policy- making and combining sophis-
ticated scientific analysis with societal interests. However, shallow or 
symbiotic IA systems have in common that they fail to reach any of these 
two distinct goals of IA as they both lack sufficient analytical complexity 
and extensive discussion of consultation in the text. By implication, rudi-
mentary, shallow cost- benefit analysis (CBA) and cost- effectiveness type 
IAs indicate the implementation of shallow IA practices while participa-
tory and symbiotic IAs indicate the implementation of well- developed IA 
practices.
Decomposing IA production across Europe into these five distinct types 
reveals that most of the growth in IA activities is due to the increased 
number of shallow CBA, rudimentary and symbiotic types (Figure 19.3). 
Cost- effectiveness and participatory type IA numbers have been largely 
stable at least since 2008. These basic facts point towards a dynamically 
changing IA landscape where both shallow and well- developed IA prac-
tices increasingly spread across Europe.
Laggard or late adopter countries display a distinctively different distri-
bution of IA types compared to non- laggard countries (Figure 19.4). They 
have a much higher proportion of rudimentary and shallow CBA type IAs 
and a much lower proportion of the participatory type. This suggests that 
laggards are more readily implementing shallow practices.
However, the close to identical proportion of symbiotic and cost- 
effectiveness type IAs suggest that not every laggard is following a dif-
ferent path compared to non- laggards. Moreover, two late adopters have 
made it into the top five European countries publishing symbiotic IAs: 
France and the Czech Republic (Figure 19.5).
The unexpected position of France and the Czech Republic could 
follow from specific patterns of diffusion. Thus, a considerable innova-
tion was introduced by France, where as of end of 2009 it has become 
the only European country to provide for a constitutional basis for IA 
and an enforcement mechanism.8 Following the new system, if an IA is 
not attached to a bill the government sends to the parliament, or if it is of 
poor quality, the conference of presidents of the parliamentary chamber 
may refuse to put the bill on the agenda. The principal reason that led to 
Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli - 9781782549550
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/07/2017 10:32:50PM
via Duke University Law Library
297
T
ab
le
 1
9.
2 
 T
he
or
et
ic
al
ly
 b
as
ed
 a
nd
 e
m
pi
ri
ca
lly
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
IA
 ty
pe
s a
nd
 th
ei
r d
ef
in
in
g 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
 E
ur
op
e,
 
20
06
Q
1–
20
12
Q
2
Sc
op
e
So
ph
ist
ic
at
io
n
C
on
su
lta
tio
n
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
po
lic
y 
op
tio
ns
C
os
t 
fig
ur
es
B
en
ef
it 
fig
ur
es
R
ud
im
en
ta
ry
 IA
lo
w
lo
w
lo
w
lo
w
no
no
ne
no
ne
Sh
al
lo
w
 C
B
A
 IA
m
ed
iu
m
lo
w
m
ed
iu
m
/lo
w
lo
w
no
so
m
e
so
m
e
C
os
t-
 ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s I
A
lo
w
lo
w
m
ed
iu
m
/lo
w
m
ed
iu
m
/lo
w
no
m
an
y
no
ne
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
IA
 
m
ed
iu
m
/h
ig
h
lo
w
hi
gh
hi
gh
ye
s
so
m
e
so
m
e
Sy
m
bi
ot
ic
 IA
hi
gh
hi
gh
hi
gh
hi
gh
ye
s
m
an
y
m
an
y
So
ur
ce
: 
G
ut
en
be
rg
 p
ro
je
ct
 d
at
ab
as
e.
Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli - 9781782549550
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 03/07/2017 10:32:50PM
via Duke University Law Library
298  Handbook of regulatory impact assessment
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Rudimentary
Cost-effectiveness
Shallow CBA
Participatory
Symbiotic
Note: * Data only refer to the first half of 2012, so the figures are multiplied by two to 
arrive at a comparable estimate.
Source: Gutenberg project database.
Figure 19.3  Total number of distinct IA types across Europe, 
2006Q1–2012Q2
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Figure 19.4  Distribution of IAs published in laggard and non- laggard 
countries according to IA types, Europe, 2006Q1–2012Q2
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this constitutional amendment is the mobilization of domestic administra-
tive and political elites in favour of evaluation as a tool for improving the 
quality of legislation (Assemblée Nationale 2009; Lasserre 2004; Sénat 
2009) and a broad consensus, across the political spectrum, in favour of 
this objective, with a constitutional anchorage of the practice, hinting at 
a possible joint operation of emulation through the voter information 
model, and the externalities pattern through competition for regulatory 
quality.
The Czech success followed the reform that started in 2010 that by 2012 
resulted in a two- tier system, linking IA to the legislative planning stage. 
At the first stage, an obligatory preliminary IA is produced for all propos-
als when the annual Plan of Legislative Works of the Government is com-
posed each year, thus checking for the necessity to proceed to the second 
stage and conduct a full IA. The IA Committee, which is an independent 
expert oversight body, has to be involved in the approval of this Plan of 
Legislative Tasks of the Government. All the draft bills that are intro-
duced outside the Plan have to have full IA by default. The strengthened 
institutional framework saw the shifting of the IA unit from a line minis-
try to the Government Office under the direct supervision of the Deputy 
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Figure 19.5  Top five countries that publish symbiotic IA, Europe, 
2006Q1–2012Q2
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Prime Minister on Legislative process. In addition, since the beginning 
of 2012, the Czech IA Committee has been actively cooperating with 
German, Dutch, Swedish and British IA watchdogs, thus illustrating a 
parallel process of horizontal diffusion through a pattern of socialization.
19.5 CONCLUSION
Several patterns of diffusion may operate in parallel, thus rendering any 
effort to define a straightforward link between a specific pattern of diffu-
sion and the emergence of a prevalent type of IA particularly difficult, if 
not impossible. However, there is a link between the process of diffusion 
and diffusion outcomes. Most latecomer European jurisdictions adopt 
and implement shallow and narrow IA practices with some notable excep-
tions such as France and the Czech Republic. Overall, the relative propor-
tions of shallow and well- developed IA practices have remained the same, 
around 60–70 per cent of published IAs belonging to the shallow type, 
with both practices growing at a similar rate (Figure 19.6).
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Source: Gutenberg project database.
Figure 19.6  Combined number of IAs grouped by shallow and well- 
developed IA practice, Europe, 2006Q1–2012Q2
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NOTES
1. On the question of the typology of IAs, see Lianos and Fazekas (2014).
2. By ‘evidence eco- system’ we mean the practices, institutional set- up and processes of 
production and use of scientific evidence in rulemaking.
3. The need for action at the Member States level was stressed during the preparatory work 
for the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance stating that ‘action 
at Community level alone – and a fortiori by the Commission alone – is certain not to 
succeed’ (Renda 2006).
4. Currently Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.
5. Currently Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. Compared to earlier publications data on one country, Lithuania, is not reported as it 
appears to have published 10 423 IAs. This high figure requires further clarification.
7. Actual sample sizes may be smaller than this because some IAs were removed due to 
quality reasons; work is in progress.
8. Article 8 of the la loi organique 2009403 du 15 avril 2009 relative à l’application des 
articles 341, 39 et 44 de la Constitution.
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